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Abstract:
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of
competition policy￿preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour.
Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems
(we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and
takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction￿a hybrid of the sealed-bid and
ascending auctions￿may often perform better. However, everything depends on
the details of the context; the circumstances of the U.K. mobile-phone license auction
made an ascending format ideal.
Auction design is a matter of ￿horses for courses￿, not ￿one size ￿ts all￿.
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1Disclaimer: I was the principal auction theorist advising the U.K. government￿s Radiocom-
munications Agency, which designed and ran the recent U.K. mobile-phone license auction. Ken
Binmore had a leading role and supervised experiments testing the proposed designs. Other aca-
demic advisors included Tilman Borgers, Jeremy Bulow, Philippe Jehiel, and Joe Swierzbinski.
The views expressed in this paper are mine alone.
The views expressed on past and future radiospectrum auctions in Germany, Holland, and the
U.S.A., gold auctions, electricity markets, takeover battles, and football TV-rights auctions are
also mine alone.1. Introduction
Now that many economic markets￿from electricity and ￿nancial markets
to mobile-phone license auctions and business-to-business internet markets￿
are analysed as auctions, there is a danger that the lessons of traditional
economics may sometimes be overlooked.
Most auction literature assumes a ￿xed number of bidders who behave
non-cooperatively. For example, a typical survey (my own1 is no exception)
begins with the revenue-equivalence result and discusses the eﬀects of risk-
aversion, correlation of information, budget-constraints, asymmetries etc.,
with relatively little attention￿re￿ecting the scant literature2￿to collusion
and entry deterrence. But while the thinness of the auction-theoretic litera-
ture on these latter topics may be defensible to the extent general economic
principles apply, there is a real danger that they may be underemphasized in
applications.
The most important issues in designing auction markets probably remain
those with which competition authorities have traditionally been concerned￿
discouraging collusive, predatory and entry-deterring behaviour.3
2. Collusion
While explicit collusion can be a problem, a much bigger concern is
￿tacit￿ (and often legal) coordination among ￿rms, just as this is probably
1Klemperer (1999a).
2The most important contributions to the economics literature on auctions are collected
in Klemperer (2000).
3In addition to addressing these issues of conduct, competition authorities also analyse
the merits of mergers or other changes to market structure. See [penultimate section].
1the greater problem for competition policy given existing law. Multi-unit
ascending and uniform-price auctions seem particularly vulnerable to tacit
collusion.
In a multi-unit ascending auction, bidders can use the early stages when
prices are still low to signal their views about who should win which objects,
and then, when consensus has been reached, tacitly agree to stop pushing
prices up.
For example, in a 1999 German spectrum auction of ten licences, Man-
nesmann bid a low price for half the licenses and a slightly lower price for
the other half. Here is what one of T-Mobil￿s managers said. ￿There were
no agreements with Mannesmann. But Mannesman￿s ￿rst bid was a clear
oﬀer.￿ It seems T-Mobil understood that it could raise the bid on the other
half of the licenses slightly, and that the two companies would then ￿live and
let live￿ with neither company challenging the other on ￿the other￿s￿ half.
Just that happened. The auction closed after just two rounds with each of
the bidders having half the licenses for the same low price.4
Similarly, a 1997 U.S. spectrum auction that was expected to raise $1,800
million raised less than $14 million. While the enormous revenue shortfall
was surely not all due to ￿collusion￿, Cramton and Schwartz (1999) explain
how bidders used the ￿nal three digits of multi-million dollar bids to signal
the i.d. numbers of the areas they coveted.5
4The auction was a simultaneous ascending auction in which any new bid on a license
had to exceed the previous high bid by at least 10%. Mannesman￿s ￿rst bids were 18.18
million DM per MHz on licenses 1-5 and 20 million DM per MHz on licenses 6-10. The
point, of course, is that 18.18 plus a 10% raise equals 19.998 ≈ 20 which is exactly what
T-Mobil then bid on licenses 1-5 in round 2, after which no further bids were made.
The story in this paragraph is from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29/10/99, p.13,
and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000). It is my understanding that the bidders￿ behaviour
was entirely legal.
5For example, in another auction U.S. West was competing ￿ercely with McLeod for
2By contrast, bidders cannot easily achieve the same coordination in si-
multaneous conventional ￿rst-price sealed-bid auctions, in which each object
is sold to the highest bidder at the price it bid for that object. In this case,
there is neither the opportunity to signal, nor the ability to retaliate against
a bidder who fails to cooperate; the low prices in the ascending auction are
supported by the threat that if a bidder overbids a competitor anywhere,
then the competitor will retaliate by overbidding the ￿r s tb i d d e ro nm a r k e t s
where the ￿r s tb i d d e rh a st h eh i g hb i d s .
However, the problem of ￿implicit collusion￿ can arise in one special kind
of sealed-bid auction, namely a uniform-price auction for multiple units of a
homogeneous good (e.g. electricity). In a uniform-price auction the price for
every unit is set only by the lowest winning bid, so the remainder of ￿rms￿
bidding schedules can be used as costless threats that will determine prices
only if another bidder deviates from an implicitly-agreed market division.6
That is, bidders can tacitly agree to divide up the market at a very favourable
price for themselves by each bidding extremely aggressively for smaller quan-
tities than ￿its share￿, thus deterring other bidders from bidding for more.
The U.K. electricity regulator believes this market has fallen prey to exactly
Rochester, MN (license 378). Although most bids were in exact $1,000s, U.S. West
made bids such as $313,378 in Waterloo, IA, and $62,378 in Marshaltown, IA, where
McLeod had the previous high-bids, together with other similar bids apparently intended
to punish McLeod, after which McLeod stopped competing in Rochester. This story
is from Cramton and Schwartz (1999). See also ￿Learning to Play the Game￿, The
Economist, 17/5/97, p. 120.
6[Note Y] With many units, the lowest winning bid in a uniform-price auction is typi-
cally not importantly diﬀerent from the runner-up￿s bid, so this auction is analogous to an
ascending auction (in which every winner pays the runner-up￿s willingness-to-pay). The
￿threats￿ that support collusion in a uniform-price auction are likewise analogous to those
supporting collusion in an ascending auction.
Note that ￿collusion￿ in the uniform-price auction is supported even as a static ￿Nash
equilibrium￿. Implicit collusion is harder if supply is uncertain since this reduces the
number of points on the bid schedule that are inframarginal and can be used as threats.
See Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Klemperer (1999, 2000) for more general discussion.
3this kind of ￿collusion￿.7
Again, by contrast, ￿implicit collusion￿ is harder in a discriminatory auc-
tion in which every winner pays its actual bids for the quantity it wins,8 so
￿rms cannot use inframarginal bids as costless threats that support the col-
lusive equilibrium. Partly for this reason the U.K. regulator has proposed a
set of New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) that will replace the
uniform-price auction by an exchange market followed by a discriminatory
auction.9
Furthermore, although it is easier for ￿rms to collude in any auction
that is repeated many times,10 it remains true that repeated ascending and
uniform-price auctions are generally more susceptible to collusion than are
repeated sealed-bid and discriminatory auctions.
Although some of the ￿collusive￿ tactics described above may be illegal,
or could be made illegal, it is much better to deal with these problems via
auction design than by cumbersome rules that restrict bidders￿ ￿exibility,
and may create ineﬃciencies, without being fully eﬀective.
3. Entry Deterrence and Predation
Another key concern of competition policy is ensuring new entry is not
too hard; an auction with too few bidders will both be unpro￿table for the
7See Oﬃce of Gas and Electricity Markets (1999), pages 173-4. In this market sellers
bid supply schedules so ￿implicit collusion￿ leads to high prices.
8[ N o t eZ ]T h i si sa n a l o g o u st oa￿rst-price sealed-bid auction.
9Whether this change is enough to fully resolve the problem in a market that has
relatively few bidders and is so frequently repeated is beyond the scope of this paper. See
Klemperer (1999b).
10It is harder for bidders to collude if the repetition is ￿nite, since collusion is no easier
t os u s t a i ni nt h e￿nal auction than in a single auction, hence hard in the penultimate
auction, etc.
4auctioneer11 and potentially ineﬃcient.
Ascending auctions may be particularly poor in this respect also. In an
ascending auction there is a strong presumption that the ￿rm which values
winning the most will be the eventual winner because even if it is outbid at
an early stage it can, and will, eventually top any opposition. So other ￿rms
have very little incentive to enter the bidding, and may not do so if they have
any costs of bidding.
Consider, for example, Glaxo￿s 1995 takeover of the Wellcome drugs com-
pany (that created the world￿s largest drugs group). After Glaxo￿s ￿rst $9
billion bid, Wellcome solicited higher oﬀers and received serious expressions
of interest from two potential counterbidders: Zeneca was willing to oﬀer
about $10 billion if it could be sure of winning, while Roche considered an
$11 billion oﬀer.12 The diﬃculty was that neither of the potential bidders
wished to enter an auction that they expected to lose. The general percep-
tion was that there were particular synergies that made Wellcome worth a
little more to Glaxo than to any other potential bidder, and ￿Glaxo had let
it be known that it would almost certainly top a rival bid￿.13 Even though
the costs of bidding were small compared with the stakes involved, they were
non-trivial (tens of $ millions).14 So neither counterbidder actually entered
11In a notorious German auction of three radiospectrum licenses (in which no bidder
was allowed to win more than one license) exactly three bidders entered. So no bidder
needed to exceed the (modest) reserve price that had been set.
More generally, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) stress the value of attracting additional
bidders, relative to other concerns in auction design. For a theoretical application of this
point see Gilbert and Klemperer (2000).
12See Financial Times 8/3/95 p. 26, 27, 32, for this story and the direct quotes. (To
be precise, the potential bidders are described as ￿understood to be Zeneca￿, ￿thought to
be Roche￿, etc.)
13Financial Times 8/3/95 p. 32.
14Glaxo￿s own fees were reported to be $30 million net of stamp duty.
The point that even modest entry fees have a serious deterrence eﬀect is analogous to
the competition-policy point that the contestability of a market is non-robust to even
5the bidding; Wellcome was sold at the original $9 billion bid price, and its
shareholders received literally billions of pounds less than they might have.15
This kind of problem will arise whenever the auction form makes one
￿rm the likely winner.16 Potential opponents, who might sometimes have
won, become no-shows. However, the problem is exarcabated, and can even
drive out bidders with no costs of participating in the ascending auction, in
￿common-values￿ contexts in which bidders have the same (or close to the
same) actual value but diﬀerent information about that actual value.
The reason is the ￿winner￿s curse￿. When the prize has a similar value to
everyone, every ￿rm must bid cautiously to allow for the fact that it is most
likely to win on those occasions when it has over-estimated the value of the
prize. But beating an opponent with an advantage suggests one has over-
estimated the value by even more, so one must bid even more cautiously.
And if the weaker ￿rms must be more cautious, the advantaged ￿rm can
be less cautious since beating very cautious opponents need not imply one
has overestimated the prize￿s value.17 So in an ascending auction a bidder
with even a small advantage is justi￿ed in taking the view that it should
almost always be prepared to outbid its rivals, if necessary, since its rivals
will be being very cautious anyway. Therefore rational rivals will bid very
cautiously, if they bother to bid at all, since they know they can beat the
advantaged bidder only if the advantaged bidder has extremely discouraging
small sunk costs.
15The chairman and chief executive of Wellcome stated afterwards ￿...there was money
left on the table.￿ (Financial Times 8/3/95 p.32.) Note that for legal reasons Wellcome
felt unable to pay other bidders￿ costs of bidding, and might also have been precluded
from other sales mechanisms (such as a sealed-bid auction).
16In auction-theorists￿ language this is true in either ￿private-values￿ or ￿common-
values￿ settings.
17That is, ￿rms￿ bids are very strongly ￿strategic substitutes￿ in the terminology of
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985a,b).
6private information about the value of the prize. And because weak rivals
will bid cautiously, if at all, the advantaged bidder not only wins most of the
time, but also generally pays a low price when it does win.
The bidding on the Los Angeles license in the main (1995, broadband)
U.S. auction for mobile-phone licenses illustrates this problem. While the
license￿s value was hard to estimate, it was probably worth very similar
amounts to several bidders, except that Paci￿c Telephone had small but
distinct advantages from its database on potential local customers, its well-
known brand-name, and its executives￿ familiarity with California.18 The
auction was an ascending auction.19 The result was that although some
other ￿rms did enter the auction and made some bids,20 the bidding stopped
at a price that most commentators thought was very low relative to the prices
of other licenses where the auction was more symmetric.21
Because outcomes in an ascending auction can be dramatically in￿uenced
by apparently small advantages in valuation or in reputation for being a
18Paci￿c Telephone was the ￿Baby Bell￿ which operated the wireline (￿xed-line) tele-
phone business in the area, and there might also have been other small economies of scope
between the wireless and wireline businesses. Paci￿c Telephone also had no wireless prop-
erties prior to the auction, so had a strategic reason to enter the market as a hedge against
its declining wireline business.
19More precisely, it was a simultaneous ascending auction, but this does not aﬀect our
argument.
20Some potential bidders seem to have been scared out of the bidding altogether. For
example, GTE and Bell Atlantic made deals that made them ineligible to bid for the Los
Angeles license, and MCI￿one of the US￿s largest phone companies￿also failed to enter
the auction at all.
21The price for the single Los Angeles license was $26 per head of population. Compare
this with Chicago where two licenses were sold for $31 per head of population. Yet
most commentators thought LA￿s demographics were superior to Chicago￿s (Southern
Californians are characterised as rich, loving new toys￿as portable phones then were￿
and spending much of their time stuck on highways with little else to do than phone their
friends), so that LA should have yielded the higher price.
A similar situation developed in New York and its license was also sold rather cheaply
($17 per head of population).
For econometric evidence of the eﬀects described here, in the FCC auctions more broadly,
see Klemperer and Pagnozzi (2001). See also Bulow and Klemperer (2000).
7strong bidder, there is a strong incentive to invest in creating these advan-
tages to deter the entry of potential rivals and to predate on actual rivals.
Thus, for example, Glaxo made it very clear that it ￿would almost certainly
top a rival bid￿,22 and Paci￿c Telephone both said ￿if somebody takes Cal-
ifornia away from us, they￿ll never make any money￿23 and also hired one
of the world￿s most prominent auction theorists to give seminars to the rest
of the industry to explain the logic and implications of the ￿winner￿s curse￿
argument that justi￿es this statement.24
In another prominent example of apparent predation BSkyB (Rupert
Murdoch￿s satellite television company) last year attempted to acquire Manch-
ester United (England￿s most successful football club). The problem here
was the potential eﬀect on the auction of football TV rights. Since Manch-
ester United receives 7 per cent of the Premier League￿s television revenues,
BSkyB would then have received 7 per cent of the price of the league￿s broad-
casting rights, whoever won those rights. So BSkyB would have had an
incentive to bid more aggressively in an ascending auction to push up the
price of the rights and, knowing this, other potential bidders would have
backed oﬀ. BSkyB might have eﬀectively ended up with a lock over the TV
rights with correspondingly deleterious eﬀects on the pay TV (or even general
TV) market more generally. Largely for this reason the U.K. Government
22Financial Times 8/3/95 p. 32.
23Wall Street Journal 31/10/94 p. A4.
24Note how anti-competitive the statements in this paragraph would seem in a normal
competition-policy context in which dominant ￿rms are threatened by new entry into
their markets. The statement attributed to Glaxo would translate roughly to saying it
￿would almost certainly undercut any new entrant￿s price￿, while that attributed to Paci￿c
Telephone would seem to correspond to threatening that ￿if anyone tries to compete with
us, we￿ll cut the price until they lose money.￿ Hiring an auction theorist to explain
the winner￿s curse to competititors might correspond to hiring an industrial economist to
explain the theory of the diﬃculties entering new markets to potential entrants.
8blocked the acquisition.25 Subsequently, however, and con￿rming this view
of BSkyB￿s motive, BSkyB has taken smaller (mostly about 10p e rc e n t )
stakes in Manchester United, Manchester City, Chelsea, Leeds United and
Sunderland thus obtaining a similar ￿toehold￿26 in the value of the league￿s
television revenues while circumventing the competition watchdogs￿ restric-
tions on it owning too much of any one football club.27 Meanwhile BSkyB￿s
leading rivals have countered in similar style, with NTL, for example, taking
partial stakes in Aston Villa, Leicester, Middlesborough, and Newcastle.28
These are all examples of ascending auctions. Although an advantaged
bidder is also more likely to win a sealed-bid auction, the outcome is much
less certain because each bidder must make a single ￿best and ￿nal￿ oﬀer in
the face of uncertainty about its rivals￿ bids. Since it is restricted to a single
bid in a sealed-bid auction, the advantaged ￿rm cannot follow the strategy
it would use in an ascending auction of starting low and bidding higher only
if it has to; because it wants to get a bargain, its sealed bid will not be
the maximum it could be pushed to in an ascending auction. So ￿weaker￿
25[Note M] See U.K. Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1999). This report explicitly
refers to Klemperer (1998) and Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999), etc., though none
of these authors had any involvement in this case. The report also discusses diﬃculties
with other auction forms in this context.
26The eﬀect described here was named the ￿toehold eﬀect￿ by Bulow, Huang and Klem-
perer (1999) who ￿rst pointed out its importance in the context of takeover battles in which
one or more contestants had ￿toeholds￿ in the target company. In this context there is
empirical evidence that ￿greater toeholds increase the probability of a successful single-bid
contest by lowering both the chance of entry by a rival bidder and target management
resistance￿ (Betton and Eckbo, 1995).
27These stakes also gives BSkyB some rights over the clubs￿ internet broadcasting rights,
which may increase the value of the main (live) rights to BSkyB, thus giving it a further
advantage in the auction of the main rights.
28And the Premier League responded by changing the format of its June 2000 TV rights
auction to a sealed-bid style auction which resolved some of the diﬃculties (see below),
but not all of them. In particular, not only did the rules include some ascending aspects,
but it is also not clear that the League could or would in every circumstance have stuck
to the result of the auction in the face of a further bid (or threats) from a defeated bidder,
so this was not a pure sealed-bid auction. A pure sealed-bid auction may not be possible
in this context. (See note M.)
9￿rms have at least some chance of victory in a sealed-bid auction. It follows
that potential entrants are likely to be more willing to enter a sealed-bid
auction than an ascending auction.29 Furthermore, since a ￿weaker￿ bidder
can win in less extreme circumstances in a sealed-bid auction, it also faces a
less severe ￿winner￿s curse￿, and so is also likely to bid more strongly having
entered the sealed-bid auction than it would bid in an ascending auction.30
The logic is related to, but must be distinguished from, the standard
competition-policy argument that a market that is in principle more com-
petitive (for example, ￿Bertrand￿ rather than ￿Cournot￿) is less attractive
to entry, so may be less competitive in fact. The diﬀerence here is that a
sealed-bid auction may both attract more ￿rms than an ascending auction,
and lead to more satisfactory outcomes for a given number of ￿rms. So in our
context there is no trade-oﬀ between competitiveness ex-post, and attracting
entry ex-ante. Of course, just as the less competitive (Cournot) market sac-
ri￿ces some ex-post production eﬃciency, a sealed-bid auction is less likely
to allocate the prize to the party who values it most among a given set of
bidders. But neither short-run production eﬃciency nor eﬃcient allocation
of the prize is the only objective. In particular, raising revenue should be an
additional objective for a government, because of the substantial deadweight
losses of raising government funds through alternative methods.31￿32
29These results all apply whether bidders have ￿private-values￿ or ￿common-values￿.
30This last result applies when there are some ￿common-values￿ components. For
discussion of why the ￿winner￿s curse￿ is much less signi￿cant in asymmetric sealed-bid
auctions then in asymmetric ascending auctions see Klemperer (1998), Section 6.1.
31Feldstein (1999) estimates that increasing income tax costs $3 (i.e. generates $2 of
deadweight losses) for every $1 raised in the U.S.
32Note that ￿rst-price sealed-bid and discriminatory auctions (which are in some ways
analogous￿see note Z) are not always more inviting to all kinds of new entry than are
ascending and uniform-price auctions (which are analogous to each other￿see note Y).
For example, a bidder with inelastic demand for a small quantity can safely place a high
bid in a uniform price auction in the knowledge that the price will be determined by
others, but needs more information to make a sensible bid in a discriminatory price auc-
104. Solving the Problems: the Anglo-Dutch Auction33
So ascending auctions can often support both collusive and predatory
activity. But an ascending auction is also particularly likely to allocate
the prizes to the bidders who value them the most.34, 35 Furthermore, an
ascending auction allows bidders to learn about others￿ valuations during
the auction, which can both make the bidders more comfortable with their
own assessments and often raises the auctioneer￿s revenues36 if collusion and
predation are absent.
So what should an auction designer do?
One solution to the dilemma of choosing between the ascending and
sealed-bid forms is to combine the two in a hybrid, the ￿Anglo-Dutch￿,37
which often captures the best features of both.
For simplicity assume a single object is to be auctioned. Then in an
Anglo-Dutch auction the auctioneer begins by running an ascending auction
until just two bidders are willing to pay the current asking price. That
is, the price is raised continuously until all but two bidders have dropped
out. The two remaining bidders are then each required to make a ￿best and
tion. Attractiveness to small bidders may not be important since they can buy from
larger intermediaries who can aggregate smaller bidders￿ demands and bid in their places.
However, our main, and robust, claim is just that attractiveness to entry is important.
We do not claim that sealed-bid style auctions always dominate ascending style auctions
in this respect.
33The Anglo-Dutch auction was ￿rst described and proposed in Klemperer (1998).
34At least among the bidders who show up.
35This is not necessarily the same as maximizing eﬃciency; when bidders are ￿rms it
ignores consumer welfare (which is likely to favour a more widely dispersed ownership than
￿rms would choose) and, of course, it ignores government revenue.
Allowing resale is not a substitute for an eﬃcient initial allocation. See Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) and Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987).
36Milgrom and Weber (1982) show this is true if information is ￿aﬃliated￿.
37Ascending and sealed-bid auctions are sometimes called English and Dutch auctions,
respectively. Hence the name ￿Anglo-Dutch￿.
11￿nal￿ sealed-bid oﬀer that is not lower than the current asking price, and
the winner pays his bid. The process is much like the way houses are often
sold, although unlike in many house sales the procedure the auctioneer will
follow in an Anglo-Dutch auction is clearly speci￿ed in advance.
The main value of this procedure is when one bidder (for example, the
incumbent operator of a license that is to be re-auctioned) is thought to be
stronger than potential rivals. Absent the ￿nal sealed-bid, the potential
rivals might be unwilling to enter against the strong bidder who would be
perceived to be a sure winner. But the sealed-bid induces some uncertainty
about which of the two ￿nalists will win, and entrants are attracted by the
knowledge that they have a chance to make it to this ￿nal stage. So the
price may easily be higher even by the end of the ￿rst, ascending, stage
of the Anglo-Dutch auction, than if a pure ascending auction were used.
A tt h es a m et i m et h eA n g l o - D u t c hp r o c e d u r ew i l lg e n e r a l l yb em o r el i k e l y
to sell to the highest valuer than a pure sealed-bid auction, both because
it directly reduces the numbers allowed into the sealed-bid stage and also
because the two ￿nalists can learn something about each other￿s and the
remaining bidders￿ perceptions of the object￿s value from behaviour during
the ascending stage.
The Anglo-Dutch auction can be extended to multi-object contexts, in-
cluding contexts in which individual bidders are permitted to win multiple
units. In these cases it has the additional advantage of making collusion
much harder than in a pure ascending auction;38 because the sealed-bid stage
allows ￿rms to renege on any tacit deals without fear of retaliation, they are
38In the single-indivisible-object case, tacit collusion is unlikely to be a problem since
bidders cannot share the spoils without resort to side-payments.
12unlikely to make such deals in the ￿rst place.39,40
Analysis of other factors suggests that the Anglo-Dutch may have addi-
tional merits. In particular, the ascending stage of the Anglo-Dutch auction
may extract most of the information that would be revealed by a pure as-
cending auction, and hence capture most of the consequent bene￿ts of raising
revenues41 and making bidders more comfortable with their own assessments.
At the same time the Anglo-Dutch may do almost as well as a pure sealed-bid
auction in capturing extra revenue (relative to what would be expected from
an ascending auction) due to the eﬀects of bidders￿ risk-aversion, budget-
constraints, and asymmetries. These eﬀects apply even if the Anglo-Dutch
auction attracts no more bidders into the market.42
In short, the Anglo-Dutch auction often combines the best of both the
ascending and the sealed-bid worlds.43
39Furthermore, if there are complementarities between the objects, the ascending stage
makes it more likely that bidders will win eﬃcient bundles than in a pure sealed-bid auction
in which they can learn nothing about their opponents￿ intentions.
40Obviously the auction designer￿s armoury has many other tools that ￿ght collusion and
predation, for example, reserve prices (possibly secret), policies about what information
is released, etc.
41Milgrom and Weber (1982) shows the information revealed raises expected revenues
if bidders￿ information is ￿aﬃliated￿.
42 However, the eﬀects in this paragraph are conjectures that need further research to
con￿rm.
43Many variants of the Anglo-Dutch auction are possible. With a single object for
sale it may be desirable to move to the sealed-bid stage when there are still more than
two bidders remaining. With multiple homogenous objects there is a choice between a
discriminatory and a uniform price (but using the lowest-winner￿s price not the highest
runner-up￿s price) sealed-bid stage. With N objects the ascending stage will typically
continue until N+1 bidders remain, but the rule for moving to the sealed-bid stage is
more complex if bidders are allowed to win multiple objects. If objects are heterogenous,
the ascending stage for each object should probably be completed simultaneously and
independently, as in a Simultaneous Ascending auction, prior to collecting the sealed bids
for any object, and a rule for ordering the sealed bids for the diﬀerent objects is required.
135. The U.K. Mobile-Phone License Auction
The U.K. third-generation mobile spectrum license auction of March-
April 2000 illustrates how good auction design is sensitive to the context:44
The U.K. originally planned to auction just four third-generation licenses.
In this case the presence of exactly four incumbent operators who might be
thought to have advantages over other bidders45 meant the designers were
very concerned that an ascending auction might deter new ￿rms from bidding
strongly in the auction, or even from entering the auction at all.46 So in
this case the government proposed running an Anglo-Dutch auction. An
ascending auction would have continued until just ￿ve bidders remained,
after which the ￿ve survivors would have made sealed-bids (required to be
no lower than the current price level) for the four licenses.47 The design
performed extremely well in laboratory experiments commissioned by the
Radiocommunications Agency.48
44I was the principal auction theorist advising the Radicommunications Agency which
designed and ran the auction. Ken Binmore had a leading role and supervised experiments
testing the proposed designs. Other academic advisors included Tilman Borgers, Jeremy
Bulow, Philippe Jehiel, and Joe Swierzbinski. The views expressed are mine alone.
45BT, One2One, Orange and Vodafone were the existing operators and were probably
generally predicted to be the ￿strong￿ bidders, both because of their brand-name advan-
tages over a new entrant, and because of their lower costs of building out a network.
46[Note N] Eﬃciency was the main concern of the U.K. government. More precisely,
in a written answer to a Parliamentary Question, Barbara Roche, then Minister for Small
Firms, Trade and Industry, said ￿In oﬀering through an auction licences to use speci￿ed
frequencies for the delivery of UMTS, the Government￿s overall aim is to secure, for the
long term bene￿t of UK consumers and the national economy, the timely and economically
advantageous development and sustained provision of UMTS services in the UK.
Subject to this overall aim the Government￿s objectives are to (i) utilise the available
UMTS spectrum with optimum eﬃciency; (ii) promote eﬀective and sustainable competi-
t i o nf o rt h ep r o v i s i o no fU M T Ss e r v i c e s ;a n d( i i i )s u b j e c tt ot h ea b o v eo b j e c t i v e s ,d e s i g n
an auction which is best judged to realise the full economic value to consumers, industry
and the taxpayer of the spectrum.￿ See Hansard, 18 May 1998.
47In this case it was proposed that all four winners would pay the fourth-highest sealed
bid, and a ￿nal Simultaneous Ascending stage would have followed to allocate the four li-
censes more eﬃciently among the four winners. See Radiocommunications Agency (1998a,
b) for more details.
48It performed well both in terms of eﬃciency (which was the main concern of the U.K.
Government￿see note N) and revenue generation (which was only a tertiary objective￿
14However, when it became possible to auction ￿ve licences, a straight-
foward ascending auction was no longer counterindicated, even though there
were non-trivial entry costs and relatively few potential bidders:49 Because
no bidder was permitted to win more than one license and licenses could not
be divided, every bidder would end up either a winner of a single license, or
a loser. So bidders could not collude to divide the market because there was
no way to share the spoils without resort to sidepayments. Furthermore,
with ￿ve licenses and only four incumbents, at least one license had to go
t oan e we n t r a n ta n dt h i sw o u l db eas u ﬃcient carrot to attract several new
entrants.50 So the problems of collusion and entry deterrence that this paper
has emphasised were minimal in the U.K. context, and other considerations
militated towards an ascending design.51
Therefore a version of an ascending auction was actually used, and it was
widely judged to be a success.
However, given the importance of the relationship between the number
of incumbents and the number of licenses, the Netherlands plan to follow
the actual British design seems ill-conceived since there are ￿ve incumbent
see note N). The Anglo-Dutch design was also very successful in [con￿dential information
censored while publication permission sought].
49Of course, predation and collusion are likely to be very hard when a commodity such
as gold is oﬀered to a potentially large number of bidders for whom entry to the auction
is easy. In this case auction-design issues are likely to be of second-order importance to
either price or eﬃciency. (Since I have been asked to serve on a National Audit Oﬃce
Panel of Experts to review the sale of the U.K.￿s gold stock-pile, it must be stressed
that this view about gold is purely personal. And of course running an auction may be
very important for transparency, and what is announced about the government￿s policies
is certainly important to the market.) Similarly, though much ink has been spilt on
the subject, auction design may also not be critical for many government-security sales,
(although collusion has arisen in some of these). See Klemperer (2000b).
50I nt h ee v e n tt h e r ew e r en i n en e we n t r a n t sw h o( a p p a r e n t l y )b i ds t r o n g l y . N o t et h a t
the simultaneous ascending design also guarantees that there are entrants available to
threaten every incumbent until all the objects are simultaneously ￿nally allocated.
51In particular, the ￿ve licenses were of unequal sizes. A sealed-bid component to the
design might have introduced some ineﬃciency in the allocation of licenses among winners.
15operators and ￿ve licenses in Holland. Because one of the incumbents is
thought to be relatively weak,52 the design might work satisfactorily here too.
But it is not clear how much careful thought about the local circumstances
went into the planning of this auction.
6. Market Structure
In addition to addressing problems of conduct, especially collusion and
predation, competition authorities also analyse the merits of mergers and
other changes to market structure.
Our paper has focused attention on conduct, taking structure as given.
However, when, for example, auctioning radiospectrum, auction designers
must also control the structure of the mobile-phone market that will be cre-
ated.53 Simply ￿letting the market decide￿ will bias the result towards too
few winners each of whom will win too much spectrum, since outcomes are
driven by bidders￿ pro￿ts, not by ￿nal-consumers￿ surplus, and bidders￿ joint
pro￿ts are maximised by a monopoly over radiospectrum. This is the criti-
cal defect of the planned German mobile-phone license auction in which the
number of winners is endogenous.54
52This claim has been made to me. I cannot assess its accuracy.
53Similarly, the most important issues for the competition authorities in regulating the
sale of football TV rights are: What packages are sold?, and How many packages is a
single broadcaster allowed to win?
54See Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000a) and the references therein for discussion of the
German auction, and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000b) for some more general analysis of
license auctions and market structure.
167. Conclusion
Auction design is a matter of ￿horses for courses￿, not ￿one size ￿ts all￿.
While the ascending auction is very risky in many contexts, it has also been
used very successfully in other contexts, including the recent U.K. and some
U.S. radiospectrum auctions. The U.K. example shows that auction design
is very sensitive to the details of the environment. European governments
would be foolish not to copy the U.K. in auctioning the radiospectrum, but
they would be equally foolish to blindly follow the exact U.K. design without
attention to their local circumstances.
In auction design, the devil is in the details.
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